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Abstract 
 
Do verbal reports of disgust in moral situations correspond to the concept of disgust as measured by other means, or 
are they used metaphorically to refer to anger? In this experiment, participants read scenarios describing a violation 
of a norm either about the use of the body (bodily-moral) or about harm and rights (socio-moral). They then 
expressed disgust and anger on verbal scales, and alternate representations of these emotion concepts were assessed 
through facial expression endorsement measures. When socio-moral norms were violated, anger words strongly 
predicted disgust words, and the separate role of disgust face endorsement was low, although significant. When 
bodily norms were violated, the predictive role of anger words roughly equaled the role of disgust face 
endorsements. Angry faces, however, never predicted disgust words independently of anger words. These results 
support a middle ground position in which disgust words concerning socio-moral violations are not entirely a 
metaphor for anger and bear some relationship to other representations of disgust. At the same time, however, the 
use of disgust language is more strongly related to anger language, and less strongly related to facial representations 
of disgust, for socio-moral versus bodily-moral violations. 
 
Recently, the emotion of disgust has been identified as a 
factor in moral judgment. Hypnotic suggestions to feel disgust 
have been shown to lead to harsher moral judgments (Wheatley 
& Haidt, 2005), as have subtle environmental inductions of 
disgust (Schnall, Haidt, Clore & Jordan, 2008). The individual 
difference of disgust sensitivity predicts negative judgments of 
criminals (Jones & Fitness, 2008) and sexual minorities 
(Olatunji, 2008), while outgroups that threaten values also elicit 
disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Neurologically, brain 
centers involved in disgust are also implicated in a number of 
moral judgment tasks (e.g., Moll et al. 2005; Schaich Borg, 
Lieberman & Kiehl, 2008). Drawing on this literature, some 
philosophers and psychologists have seen strong support for 
accounts of morality based on emotional reactions (Haidt, 2001; 
Prinz, 2007) 
While disgust may serve as a general input to heightened 
moral sensitivity, some moral judgments may be more prone to 
involve different hostile moral emotions, such as anger. The 
CAD hypothesis states that each emotion of the moral hostility 
triad – contempt, anger, and disgust – responds to a specific 
form of moral violation (Rozin, Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). 
While contempt responds to violations of community ethics 
(duties and obligations based on social roles), anger responds to 
violations of autonomy ethics (concerns with harm and rights) 
and disgust, to violations of divinity ethics (concerns with purity 
and use of the body). At the same time, some of the same 
authors have proposed that disgust can have socio-moral 
functions beyond the realms of purity and the body. For 
example, Haidt, Rozin, McCauley and Imada (1997) 
interviewed people in different cultural and linguistic settings 
about the term most closely corresponding to “disgust” and 
found that people nominated non-bodily socio-moral 
transgressions as disgusting. However, exactly which 
transgressions were disgusting varied between cultures; for 
example, Americans found racism and senseless murder 
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disgusting, while Japanese people found the irritating behavior 
of others disgusting, as well as their own personal failings. 
To clarify, it is helpful to think of three possible kinds of 
context that can elicit disgust words – including synonyms such 
as “repulsed” or “sickened.” The first, basic disgust, involves 
the body but not morality. It includes categories such as core 
disgust towards disease cues and death. The second, bodily-
moral disgust, involves people’s violations of norms that 
regulate people’s use of the body. It includes disgust felt at 
violations of sexual norms (incest, homosexuality), dietary 
norms (in particular, those surrounding what animals and animal 
parts should be eaten), and norms about the modification of the 
body (for example, human cloning or body piercing). Although 
it might be argued whether such body-relevant norms involve 
morality, or just cultural mores, there is evidence that violating 
them can be seen as “wrong” and not just disgusting in Western 
middle-class society (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Gutierrez & Giner-
Sorolla, 2007) and that an even wider range of body-relevant 
norms is moralized among other cultural and class backgrounds 
(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). The third, socio-moral disgust, 
involves morality but not necessarily the body itself. It includes 
activities that Miller (1997) classifies as “despicable,” for 
example, betrayal, dishonesty, or exploitation, as well as things 
like racism or sadism. A key component of these socio-moral 
elicitors of disgust is that they involve the violation of certain 
classes of rights, such as trust or equal treatment.  
Unfortunately, not all research on moral disgust has 
effectively separated basic, bodily-moral and socio-moral 
elicitors. For example, Moll et al. (2005) showed overlap 
between basic (“pure”) disgust and moral indignation, but many 
of the moral indignation stories involved elements of basic 
disgust such as cockroaches on someone’s face or rats in 
cooking pans. Although Marzillier and Davey (2004) found in a 
cluster analysis that bodily-moral and socio-moral disgust 
elicitors loaded together separately from more basic disgust 
elicitors, there is also evidence that bodily-moral disgust 
involves reactions that are typical of disgust rather than anger, 
and evident through other means than language. Royzman, 
Leeman and Sabini (2008) found that descriptions of sibling 
incest led to reports of physiological experiences characteristic 
of disgust but not anger, such as nausea and loss of appetite. 
Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla (2007) varied scenarios according 
to their violation of bodily-moral taboos and socio-moral norms 
(betrayal) and found that controlling for anger, disgust was only 
predicted by bodily-moral  violations. In addition, in a brain 
imaging study, Schaich Borg, Lieberman and Kiehl (2008) 
found evidence for the separateness as well as similarity of 
reactions to basic (“pathogen-related”), bodily-moral (incest) 
and socio-moral disgust stimuli – although their results left less 
clear whether differences in activation of various brain regions, 
particularly the insula, were found on the basis of differences in 
emotional experience, or because of other factors. 
When a person reports “socio-moral disgust” at bigoted, 
deceptive, or harmful behavior – in other words, at violations of 
various rights – the question remains whether this is only a 
peculiarity of the lexicon, or whether the concept of disgust also 
extends to other representations of emotions. Perhaps the person 
who is “disgusted” at Nazi marches or thieving bankers is 
actually reporting an emotion that they would characterize by 
choosing a facial expression of anger, and that has other 
cognitive and action components more characteristic of anger 
(cf. Royzman & Sabini, 2001; Bloom, 2004).  
Supporting this prediction, studies of the lexicon of 
emotions in English often find that people refer to disgust as a 
form of anger, or as a sub-category of anger (Alvarado, 1998; 
Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O'Connor, 1987). Nabi (2002) 
asked college undergraduate participants about the use of the 
term “disgust” and found that they described situations that 
better characterised anger, as opposed to the slang term 
“grossed out” which was reserved for episodes violating bodily 
norms. In a similar manner, Rozin, Haidt and McCauley (1999) 
reported that when participants were requested to list episodes 
in which they felt disgust, participants commonly retrieved 
episodes that theoretically elicit anger. However, to say just on 
that basis that those participants really felt anger would rest on 
somewhat circular reasoning. Specifically, if a student uses the 
word “disgusting” to upbraid a roommate damaging property, 
an act that in theory should only lead to anger, perhaps it is the 
theory and not the student that is mistaken. Evidence for this 
anger-synonym position would be more conclusive, then, if a 
context were found in which disgust language was related 
primarily to anger language or to other representations of anger 
such as endorsement of facial expressions, rather than to other 
representations of disgust. 
Another possibility is that socio-moral disgust, beyond 
the verbal label, does share important representational 
characteristics with disgust felt in non-moral contexts. 
Supporting this conclusion, Danovitch and Bloom (2009) report 
studies in which young children not only apply the verbal label 
of “disgust” to non-physical moral violations, but also associate 
these violations with a picture of a disgusted face, although to a 
lesser extent than they associated core disgust violations with 
the face. While suggestive, these studies did not offer an 
alternative negative choice such as an angry face; it is possible 
that children were attempting to provide a satisfactory answer 
on the basis of general negative feelings, for example. In a more 
direct approach to these questions, Simpson, Carter, Anthony 
and Overton (2006) compared the characteristics of disgust in 
basic versus socio-moral contexts (but importantly, not bodily-
moral contexts) using photographic stimuli. Of greatest 
importance to our concerns, their analysis found anger language 
to be a large and significant predictor of disgust language in 
socio-moral but not core disgust settings. In fact, a model with 
anger as the only significant variable predicted 67% of variance 
in socio-moral disgust. This left unclear whether socio-moral 
disgust is a form of anger or just covaries closely with anger – 
again, because no separate assessment of emotional 
representations was included.  
Tying together the existing, partial findings in the 
literature, it seems that the context in which moral disgust is 
elicited might make a difference. When disgust responds to 
socio-moral violations of rights that do not involve norms about 
the use of the body, existing research suggests that the use of 
disgust language will be strongly related to anger language. 
When disgust responds to bodily-moral violations, however, 
existing research (e.g., on responses to violations of the incest 
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taboo) suggests that disgust language will be less related to 
anger language and more related to other representations of 
disgust, such as endorsement of facial expressions. The purpose 
of this study, therefore, is to test these predictions about context 
directly, by varying similar scenarios to refer to either a socio-
moral or a bodily-moral violation, and assessing participants’ 
self-reported emotions through vocabulary as well as 
endorsement of facial expressions.   
 Present Research  
This research examined the effects of moral context on 
the use of words related to the emotions of anger and disgust. 
We used endorsement of pictures of facial expressions as an 
alternate representation of these emotions. We chose facial 
expression endorsement (e.g., Rozin et al., 1999) as a measure 
of emotion concept distinct from endorsement of vocabulary 
words. It is true that categorization of faces as feeling specific 
emotions has been shown to involve the corresponding language 
concepts (Roberson & Davidoff, 2000; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-
Moreau & Russell, 2006), and so cannot be said to be 
completely language-free. But evidence from preliminary 
studies in our lab led us to believe that a scaled measure of 
facial expression endorsement was not completely redundant 
with endorsement of verbal terms, contributing at least some 
independent variance to the representation of an emotional state. 
Specifically, in a reanalysis of conditions from Gutierrez and 
Giner-Sorolla (2007) that distinctly represented bodily-moral 
and socio-moral violations, disgust face endorsement 
(controlling for anger face and anger word endorsement) 
significantly predicted disgust word endorsement only in 
bodily-moral violation conditions. This led us to believe that 
facial endorsement measures would be helpful in testing 
hypotheses about whether the application of disgust synonyms 
to a socio-moral violation reflected a situation in which the 
literal use of language was not accompanied by other aspects of 
the disgust representation.  
 In contexts where the word “disgust” and its synonyms 
are predicted strongly by disgusted facial expressions, there is 
more of a case that the language is being used to express the 
emotion of disgust, as distinct from anger. However, to the 
extent that anger language or anger faces emerge as a stronger 
predictor of disgust words, there would be more of a case that 
the verbal “disgust” expressed in that context is being used as a 
synonym for anger.  
We expected that anger would be a relatively stronger 
predictor of disgust word endorsement in contexts involving 
socio-moral violations that did not involve violating norms 
about the use of the body per se. We also expected that disgust 
faces would more strongly predict disgust words, independently 
of anger words and faces, in contexts where norms about the use 
of the body were violated without harming other people’s rights 
in a socio-moral sense. These predictions were tested in our 
study  by crossing the context condition with the continuous 
effect of each predictor – anger words, anger faces, disgust 
faces – on disgust word use, and looking for moderating effects 
of condition on the effect of each predictor.   
We tested these hypotheses with an experiment varying 
the bodily-moral or socio-moral nature of scenarios that 
represented violations of norms about sexuality, eating, or body 
modification. Participants were presented with one of two 
variations of each scenario in which a moral norm was violated, 
one involving a bodily-moral action which violated a norm 
about the use of the body without harming another person, and 
the other involving socio-moral action against another person 
without violating a body-relevant norm. The pairing of the 
particular setting with socio-moral or bodily-moral violations 
was counterbalanced across participants.  
We made predictions in line with our preferred theory: 
when the moral transgression does not violate a bodily norm, 
“disgust” and its synonyms refer to a more anger-like state. 
Thus, participants should adapt their use of disgust words to 
different contexts. In bodily-moral conditions, disgust words 
should be associated most strongly with endorsement of disgust 
facial expressions. In socio-moral conditions, however, we 
expected a weaker association of disgust words with disgust 
facial expressions, and a stronger association with anger – either 
in the form of words or facial expressions. 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were undergraduate students (56 females 
and 8 males, 4 participants did not specify their gender) who 
participated on a voluntary basis in exchange for monetary 
reimbursement (£2 per participant) or partial course credit at a 
university in the Southeast of England (mean age 21.16, SD = 
6.27). 
Design 
The factors of interest in the experiment represented a 2 
(Condition: Socio-moral vs. Bodily-moral, within participants) 
x 2 (Story pair counterbalancing: Sexual relationship and meat 
substitute, vs. cloned steak and body modification, between 
participants) x 2 (Counterbalancing factor determining which 
story in each pair represented each condition, between 
participants) design. Different stories were assigned to different 
violation types in a counterbalanced manner, so that participants 
did not encounter the same story setting twice, and each story 
was presented for some participants in the socio-moral version 
and for others in the bodily-moral version. Overall, condition 
was the main factor of interest in the analysis. 
Materials 
The four story settings (Appendix), each of which could 
be presented as involving either a bodily-moral or socio-moral 
violation, were combined to create different versions of the 
questionnaire. The versions involved different combinations of 
story/moral violation, so that each questionnaire contained one 
story in which a bodily-moral violation but no harm was 
described, and a story with a different setting in which a socio-
moral violation was described. In socio-moral versions of the 
scenario, the actions of the main character of the story violated 
someone else’s rights, deceiving or coercing the other person 
into eating something, having sex, or getting a socially accepted 
body modification, (i.e., a tattoo). But, in those versions, the 
character did not violate a norm about eating, body modification 
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or sexual conduct per se. In bodily-moral versions of the 
scenarios, by contrast, the main character violated a norm about 
the use of the body without violating anyone’s rights 
(consenting to eat vulture meat or artificially created human 
flesh; two adults having sex across an extreme age difference; 
voluntarily getting a decorative scarification), but did not harm 
anyone else in the process.  
The assignment of which story represented socio-moral 
violations and which represented bodily-moral violations, as 
well as the order of the two violation types and the order of 
presentation of the face and word emotion measures, were all 
counterbalanced between participants, resulting in sixteen 
versions of the questionnaire. Participants were randomly 
assigned to read either the “meat substitute” and “sexual 
relationship” scenarios or the “cloned steak” and “body 
modification” scenarios. 
Word emotion measures. The questionnaire asked 
participants to indicate to what extent the story made them feel 
anger, disgust, infuriation, outrage, pity, repulsion, sadness, 
sickness, sorrow, sympathy, and contempt toward the main 
actor in the story. These items were answered on a scale from 1 
(Not at all) to 8 (Very). 
Facial emotion measures. Each participant saw two sets 
of photographs from the MFSDE set of emotional facial 
expressions (Beaupré, Cheung, & Hess, 2000), each showing 
three female posers (one Asian, one Black, and one White) with 
each picture measuring 27.3 mm x 38.9 mm. One set expressed 
anger and the other expressed disgust. All expressions were at 
100% intensity1. Participants were first asked to “Select one set 
                                                           
1
  Because more than one set of expressive elements can 
lead to a facial expression being perceived as angry or 
disgusted, it is important to examine the component action units 
(AU) of our stimuli according to the Facial Affect Coding 
System (FACS; Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). In development of 
the MFSDE, posers were trained to activate specific key action 
units for each expression, which were then verified by two 
coders; expressions that were not successfully identified by both 
coders were not used (Hess, personal communication, 2010). 
The target AUs for anger were 4, 5b and 23, respectively 
showing wrinkled/lowered brow, slightly raised eyelids, and 
tightened lips; the target AUs for disgust were 9d and 25, 
respectively showing wrinkled nose and parted lips (in all three 
disgust faces the teeth were visible). Although action unit 10, 
upper lip raise, is an expression common to a number of disgust 
contexts including violations of the body’s integrity, of body-
related morality, and of personal contamination, it is also 
characteristic of angry expressions (Rozin, Lowery & Ebert, 
1994). The MFSDE posers were not instructed to include AU10, 
possibly because it did not distinguish between anger and 
disgust. Thus, the expressions of anger (furrowed brow, 
tightened lips) and disgust (raised nose, loose and parted lips 
with only upper teeth visible) were intended to be distinctive, 
avoiding confusion from inclusion of the ambiguous AU10 in 
both expressions.  
 
of faces that best describes your feelings about the story.” Then 
they were asked to indicate for both sets of faces, on scales from 
1 (not at all) to 9 (Extremely), “How much of this feeling do 
you have at this point towards [the main character of the 
story]?” 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. After providing 
consent, they were presented with demographic measures (age 
and gender), followed by one of the scenarios. Participants were 
asked to read the scenario carefully and answered the word 
emotion measures, as well as the facial emotion measures. The 
second scenario and identical measures were presented after 
that. After completing the questionnaire, participants were 
thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
Verbal Emotion Measures 
Four indices were created averaging endorsement of 
words related to the emotions of anger (anger, infuriation and 
outraged; Cronbach’s α = .93); disgust (disgust, repulsion, and 
sickness; Cronbach’s α = .94); sadness (sadness, sorrow; 
Cronbach’s α = .78, r (133) = .67, p < .001) and pity (pity and 
sympathy; Cronbach’s α = .63, r (133) = .46, p < .001). A mixed 
model analysis of variance showed a significant main effect of 
Emotion F (3, 399) = 44.94, MSE = 2.34, p < .001; a non-
significant main effect of Condition, F (1, 133) = .90, MSE = 
7.97, p = .35; but a significant interaction between these factors 
F (3, 399) = 14.35, MSE = 2.34, p < .001. There was 
significantly more anger than the other emotions in socio-moral 
vs. bodily-moral scenarios and significantly more disgust than 
the other emotions in bodily-moral vs. socio-moral scenarios. 
Importantly, this analysis also revealed significantly lower 
levels of sadness and pity than anger (all t > 2.95, all p < .01) 
and disgust (all t > 2.65, all p < .01) in both conditions, as well 
as no significant differences between sadness and pity in any of 
the conditions (all t < .33, all p > .74). Sadness and pity were 
not affected by the manipulation of social vs. moral violations 
(Table 1). 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviations of measures. 
 Condition 
 Socio-moral Bodily-moral 
Anger words 4.58 (2.28)a 3.46 (1.83)b
 
Disgust words 4.15 (2.28)a 5.35 (2.07)b 
Sadness words 3.22 (1.84)a 2.66 (1.58)a 
Pity words 3.16 (1.93)a 2.73 (1.56)a 
Contempt words 3.16 (1.98)a 2.38 (1.33)b 
Selection anger face 46 (73%)a 17 (27%)b 
Selection disgust face 21 (29%)a 51 (71%)b 
Scale rating, anger face 5.72 (2.19)a 4.56 (2.18)b 
Scale rating, disgust face 4.72 (2.72)a 6.33 (2.27)b 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means in the same 
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row with different subscripts are significantly different by t-test 
or contingency coefficient at p < .01. 
Our main theoretical focus was on anger and disgust, 
rather than contempt. Because the correspondence between 
word and face measures of emotion was a crucial part of the 
study, findings of non-correspondence between use of the 
“contempt” verbal label and identification of contempt faces 
(e.g., Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004) dissuaded us from including 
contempt as a fully represented moral emotion. However, for 
exploratory purposes we analyzed the single-word measure, 
“contempt.” The “contempt” word was endorsed less strongly 
than anger and disgust language; that is, to about the same 
extent as the sadness and pity terms. It was endorsed more 
strongly in socio-moral violations than bodily-moral violations; 
a regression analysis predicting “contempt” endorsement from 
anger and disgust words and faces, too, found that only anger 
words significantly predicted it in the socio-moral condition (β 
= .87, p < .001), while none of the four anger and disgust 
indicators predicted it significantly in the bodily-moral 
condition. Thus, the word “contempt” appeared to more 
strongly characterize socio-moral than bodily-moral violations, 
and was closely related to anger language. 
Facial Measures of Emotions 
Analysis of variance of the scores of the faces 
representing anger and disgust revealed non-significant main 
effects of Emotion, F (1, 122) = 2.28, MSE = 4.11, p = .13; and 
Condition, F (1, 122) = 0.45, MSE = 6.91, p = .51. These main 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F (1, 133) = 
29.09, MSE = 4.10, p < .001, indicating more anger in the 
socio-moral condition and more disgust in the bodily-moral 
condition (Error! Reference source not found.). Finally, the 
forced choice of the faces representing anger and disgust 
showed that across the four stories the faces representing anger 
were selected more in the socio-moral condition. Conversely, 
the faces showing disgust were selected more in the bodily-
moral condition, χ2 (1) = 25.84, p < .001 (Table 1).  
Relationship between words and facial expressions  
The relationship between the words and facial 
expressions of both emotions was analysed using a multilevel 
approach with SPSS MIXED analyses. The participant number 
was entered as a random effect. The dependent variable was 
either mean endorsement of anger terms or disgust terms. 
Scores for facial expression endorsement for each emotion, as 
well as the mean endorsement of verbal terms for the other 
emotion, were entered as covariate predictors. The condition – 
socio-moral (1) vs. bodily-moral (-1) – was coded and entered 
as a main effect, and also used to generate interactions with 
each of the three covariate predictors.  
We found a significant main effect of Condition, B = -
1.82, SE = .68, p = .009, indicating that disgust words were 
endorsed more in the bodily-moral condition than in the socio-
moral condition. We also found significant main effects of 
anger words, B = 0.75, SE = .10, p < .001; and disgust faces, B 
= 0.21, SE = .08, p = .008; as well as a non-significant main 
effect of anger faces, B = -0.05, SE = .08, p = .52. A significant 
Condition x Disgust Faces interaction was present, B = 0.22, SE 
= .11, p = .04; as well as a marginal Condition x Anger Words 
interaction, B = -0.25, SE = .13, p = .06. The Condition x Anger 
Faces interaction was not significant, B = -0.15, SE = .11, p = 
.16. These interactions reflect the evident differences between 
predictors of disgust word use in the socio-moral and bodily-
moral conditions (Figure 1). That is, the use of disgust words in 
the socio-moral condition was largely predicted by anger words 
and only secondarily by disgust faces, whereas in the bodily-
moral condition the use of disgust words was predicted to a 
similar extent by disgust faces and anger words2. 
Figure 1. Anger and disgust facial endorsement, and anger word 
endorsement, as predictors of disgust word endorsement in socio-moral 
and bodily-moral contexts. Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < 
.001.  
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General Discussion 
In this experiment, the relationship of disgust vocabulary 
to a facial endorsement indicator of disgust, independently of 
anger language, was affected by the type of moral violation 
described. In a situation where someone was harmed, but taboos 
about the body were not violated, endorsement of disgust words 
was predicted primarily by the use of anger words, and only to a 
lesser extent by endorsement of disgust faces. However, in a 
situation where no actual harm was done but bodily-moral 
taboos were violated (e.g., an unusual but consensual sex act), 
disgust words were predicted about equally by anger words and 
by endorsement of disgusted faces. This evidence argues that 
moral disgust language is more strongly related to other 
representations of the disgust concept when its context is 
bodily-moral (e.g., sexual, body use, and food taboo violations), 
rather than non-bodily and socio-moral (e.g., harm, deception, 
or rights violation).  
A more difficult question is what this means for disgust 
as a moral emotion. Our results for harm-only (socio-moral) 
scenarios imply that in those situations, when someone says 
they are “disgusted” at unfairness, exploitation, or rights 
violation, the use of these disgust words has largely to do with 
                                                           
2
 A similar analysis adding the Sadness and Pity word 
indexes as predictors revealed a very similar pattern to the one 
presented. The indexes of sadness and pity words did not 
produce any significant main effects (all B < .12, all p >.30) and 
they did not interact with any of the other variables (all B < .06, 
all p > .73). 
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the use of related anger vocabulary. However, some caveats 
must also be observed when evaluating the strong position that 
the use of disgust language in socio-moral violations is only a 
metaphorical way to characterize anger. First, the use of disgust 
words was never predicted independently by endorsement of 
anger faces, controlling for anger words. And, the independent 
influence of disgust faces on disgust words still stayed 
significant in socio-moral conditions, even though it was greatly 
reduced in magnitude. Thus, verbal expressions of disgust in 
socio-moral violations still show some small correspondence to 
non-verbal representations of the disgust emotion, while 
showing a relatively stronger semantic link to anger words (cf. 
Simpson et al., 2006). This link may explain the considerable 
semantic overlap between disgust and anger vocabulary in 
English; for example, in Russell and Fehr (1994), about two 
thirds of participants volunteered “disgusted” as a synonym for 
“angry”. Perhaps they were thinking primarily of socio-moral 
contexts when they did this. A third and overarching caution is 
that overall, disgust and anger tend to be correlated and in fact 
confused emotions, not just in terms of the lexicon, but also 
when people classify facial expressions. For example, Ekman, 
(1994), points out that disgust often appears as a “common 
confusion” or second most frequent response for anger in facial 
expression studies; and the two facial expressions, as we 
observe in this article’s Footnote 1, sometimes share a common 
action unit. Although our study was interested in the differences 
between the two emotions, and thus focused only on ratings of 
the two kinds of faces, it should be recognized that in the larger 
scheme of emotions, disgust and anger as emotions of 
disapproval are close neighbors.  
In other similar studies independently manipulating 
socio-moral and bodily-moral violations in different scenarios, 
it has also been shown that when controlling for their 
correlation with each other, disgust independently responds 
most reliably to perceptions of bodily norm violation, while 
anger responds to perceptions of harm and rights violation 
(Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; P. S. Russell & Giner-
Sorolla, in press). These results are corroborated by our finding 
here, especially among facial endorsement measures, that anger 
was greater when socio-moral harm was described, and disgust 
was greater when bodily-moral violations were described.  
In response to the literature suggesting that moral disgust 
governs responses to non-bodily norm violations, a number of 
observations can be made. First, many studies manipulating or 
measuring disgust and observing effects on judgment of non-
bodily moral norms have not taken the possibility of co-
activated anger into account, often using the low-arousal 
negative emotion of sadness as a control (e.g. Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al., 2008) or no comparison emotion at 
all (e.g. Chapman, Kim, Susskind & Anderson, 2009 and the 
response by Rozin, Haidt & Fincher, 2009; Danovitch & 
Bloom, 2009). Studies that have taken care to contrast bodily 
and non-bodily moral elicitors of disgust find non-bodily 
elicitors to show quite different profiles. In particular, socio-
moral elicitors, relative to bodily elicitors, lead to a form of 
disgust that shows a much higher correlation with verbal reports 
of anger (e.g., Simpson et al., 2006). This is entirely consistent 
with our findings. However, apart from the converging results 
using facial endorsement measures, our results also build on 
Simpson et al.’s in that we have taken greater steps to ensure 
comparability of the settings of our non-bodily and bodily 
elicitors, and also have used bodily elicitors that are relevant to 
morality in the areas of food and sexuality. 
Our research can also perhaps clarify previous 
inconsistent results about the differences and similarities 
between anger and disgust. While some research suggests that 
anger and disgust are closely related, based on characteristics 
such as activation and unpleasantness (e.g., J. A. Russell & 
Feldman Barrett, 1999), other research highlights the 
differences between these two emotions as having distinct 
evolutionary and adaptive functions (e.g., Izard, 1992). 
Although previous research has established some degree of 
overlap in the use of words that refer to these two emotions, the 
role of context in moral violations and its effect on the use of 
these words was not experimentally tested. Our research offers a 
contextual clarification to contrasting findings in this debate, 
showing that disgust shows varying degrees of independence 
from anger depending on the kind of moral violation 
contemplated.  While it is also inescapably true that the two 
emotions co-occur to a great extent and are often activated 
together even in bodily-moral situations, distinctions between 
them are potentially important for predicting, for example, 
whether action tendencies will be hostile or avoidant (Gutierrez 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2007). 
Because we used endorsement of facial expressions as a 
non-verbal indicator of emotions, it is important to clarify the 
assumptions behind our approach. A prevalent view holds that 
facial expressions are a reliable way to differentiate emotions, 
being an integral part of the emotional experience (Damasio, 
1999), and that facial expressions signal specific emotions, at 
least where the “basic” emotions anger and disgust are 
concerned (Ekman, 1999). However, this view has been 
challenged by evidence that facial expressions interact with the 
situation in which the emotion is produced, so that verbal 
classifications of a given facial expression can be altered by 
context (Carroll & J. A. Russell, 1996; Feldman Barrett, 
Lindquist & Gendron, 2007). Against this backdrop we need to 
make clear that we do not necessarily take facial expressions as 
an infallible indicator of a “true” emotional state, merely as a 
non-linguistic indicator differentiating two emotions whose 
referent terms in English seem to cluster quite closely. Certainly 
future research should triangulate these findings against more 
than two types of measurement – for example, specific 
physiological responses, brain region activation, or action 
tendencies, to the extent that these can reliably differentiate 
anger from disgust. Meanwhile, our results do bear out the 
importance of context in labelling of facial expressions, 
suggesting that the accepted facial expressions and words for 
disgust may relate most reliably to each other when the context 
involves elements of bodily disgust, rather than other moral 
violations. 
To conclude, it has been suggested that the moral domain 
is based on universal categories and that emotional reactions 
have a close resemblance to this moral categorisation. For 
example, the CAD triad hypothesis proposes three moral 
domains (Rozin et.al, 1999; Shweder, Munch, Mahaptra & Park, 
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1997), while Haidt and Graham (2007) proposed five moral 
domains. In both cases disgust is an emotion associated with the 
violation of norms related to purity, sanctity and the body. 
However, based on our results, researchers may find that 
violations of the domain of autonomy (in the CAD hypothesis) 
and the domain of harm (in Haidt’s five foundations proposal) 
that theoretically elicit anger can at the same time bring forth 
words related to disgust. As a final suggestion, therefore, we 
propose that researchers use alternate measures of these two 
emotions, such as facial endorsement measures, as a way to gain 
a clearer picture of emotional reactions to moral violations. 
Only then can a clearer answer emerge to the question of what 
is truly morally disgusting, and what this means for judgment 
and behavior. 
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Appendix 1 
Scenarios used in our experiment. The socio-moral version is 
listed, with differences from the bodily-moral version in 
brackets. 
Sexual relationship (main character: “the woman”) 
A 20-year-old man and a [23-year-old woman] [bodily-
moral version: 76-year-old woman] who work in the same place 
begin to have a sexual relationship.  [The woman is the man’s 
supervisor in the organisation, so he feels pressured to continue 
the relationship.] [bodily-moral version: They are at the same 
rank in the organisation, so neither one feels pressured to 
continue the relationship.] 
Meat substitute (main character: “the man”) 
A man invites his friends over to dinner. He asks them if 
they would be all right with eating [roast duck] [bodily-moral 
version: roast vulture] that he shot on a recent hunting trip.  The 
friends say that they would rather not eat duck. [He serves them 
the duck dish anyway, saying that it’s chicken, and they eat it.] 
[bodily-moral version: The friends all agree.  He serves them 
the vulture dish and they eat it.] 
Body modification (main character: “the man”) 
A boyfriend and girlfriend are travelling abroad. The 
man thinks the woman would look good with [a small, colorful 
tattoo] [bodily-moral version: a permanent, raised, circular scar] 
on her thigh as a body decoration. [She doesn’t agree, so he gets 
her drunk, and when she is barely conscious, he takes her into a 
tattoo parlor to have it done.] [bodily-moral version: She agrees 
and goes into a scarification parlour to have it done.] 
Cloned steak (main character: “the scientist”) 
[A scientist studying recent advances in human memory 
is investigating a new drug that may increase the capabilities of 
human memory.] [bodily-moral version: A scientist studying 
recent advances in cell cloning technology takes a group of 
muscle cells from her arm and clones them in a vat]. [She takes 
some chemicals and produces a white powder without odour or 
taste. When the process is finished, she gives it to her friends at 
a dinner without their knowledge.] [bodily-moral version: The 
cells grow into a strip of human muscle tissue about the size of a 
steak. When the process is finished, she takes the strip of tissue, 
grills it, and eats it alone for dinner.] 
